

AU/ACSC/026/1999-04

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

FORCE PROTECTION FOR THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY  
EXPEDITIONARY AEROSPACE FORCES: SECURITY  
FORCES NEED FOR ORGANIC GROUND INTELLIGENCE

by

James J. Chambers, Jr., Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Lt Col Bruce E. Blaisdell

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 1999

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## *Preface*

Throughout history, intelligence failures, whether human or organizational, have caused armies to fall, countries to collapse and super powers to stand up and take notice. Intelligence is a basic need to plan and execute any operation, whether it is a local police agency crafting a plan to make an arrest of a local drug lord or a war-fighting CINC planning a military operation.

In this research project, I plan to explore the security forces organizational structure in the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF). I will look at historical failures and successes and see if there is a better way to provide intelligence information directly to the defense force commander on the ground so that his/her decisions can be timely and accurate.

As a career security forces officer, I have served at every level of the field unit. Three of my assignments were at locations where the threat made force protection key to operational mission accomplishment. In my career, I have served as a squadron commander and twice as an operations officer. Consequently, some of my conclusions will be based, not on theory or scholarly thoughts, but on my experiences and how I feel the security forces can better serve the Air Force. Hopefully, this project will give some alternative organizational structures that will be applicable across the career field.

I would like to offer special thanks to Master Sergeant Cliff Lewis of the Force Protection Battlelab. His contributions were invaluable.

### ***Abstract***

The United States military, force on force, is unmatched by any other country in the world. Our dominance encourages adversaries to seek asymmetric means to thwart our abilities to carry out our global leadership policies. To make an impact through the media and with the will of the American people, attacks on U.S. Forces will be highly visible and very deadly. It is predicted that over the next 15 years, terrorists will become even more sophisticated in their targeting, propaganda, and political action operations. Nation-states and/or non-governmental organizations that choose to wage war on the United States must rely on unconventional methods to attack our centers of gravity. The evolution of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force, placing highly lethal strike packages on targets with the lowest possible logistics footprint creates new challenges for operational and security forces commanders.

Are the security forces optimally organized to counter future threats, symmetrical and asymmetrical, to the EAF to make it a viable military instrument of power? This is the question this project will try to answer. To begin answering this question, a historical study was accomplished to determine how and why air base defense doctrine was created. It will show how today's force protection concepts were developed based on experiences and mindset of the past. Once the historical foundation of how the Air Force addresses air base defense is poured, this project will examine two recent force protection failures, their causes as seen by independent commissions, and how the failure affected the

national security strategy. This project will look at the predicted strategic environment in the next century and the threats that accompany that environment, and compare those threats to the current Department of Defense and the Air Force countermeasures.

Maintaining the premise that the Air Force needs organic ground intelligence capabilities, the final section will postulate an alternative to today's organizational structure.

## Chapter 1

### Force Protection: An old “truth” of warfare?

*“It is doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one’s readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one’s self invincible.”*

—Sun Tzu

Protecting the force is a concept as old as warfare itself. It has been practiced as the principle of war, *security*, for many years. AFDD-1 states, “The principle of security requires that friendly forces and their operations be protected from enemy actions that could provide the enemy with unexpected advantage.”<sup>1</sup> The term “force protection” became the most popular buzz phrase in the aftermath of the Khobar Towers bombing in June 1996. A shuffle ensued to redefine an age-old truth of warfare. Today’s definition is that which “prevents successful hostile actions against our combat power while it is not directly engaged with the enemy. A successful hostile action is one that, if executed, would threaten our ability to accomplish the mission. Force protection measures may be defensive (active or passive) or offensive and include the actions of every element of a combat force, encompassing the supporting community and individuals.”<sup>2</sup> Whether in Sun Tzu’s time or today, it is protecting your forces from the enemy so you can win your war, albeit the war against a conventional power or a war against those who do not play by conventional rules.



The Air Force, as a whole, due to the nature of airpower and limited front line operations interprets *security* (therefore force protection) much differently than its sister services whose missions are carried out on the ground. The Army and the Marine Corps, since their inception, have had to focus on protecting their forces at every phase of an operation. The threat to a forward ground unit is ever present and the mindset is in place to counter ground threats. The Air Force whose main focus for many years was strategic in nature enjoyed a CONUS buffer zone and that explains the mindset exemplified in AFDD 1. “Security may be obtained by staying beyond the enemy’s reach. Air and space forces are uniquely suited to capitalize on this through their global capabilities.”<sup>3</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, traditional Air Force ways of doing business have been challenged by an enemy who plays by different rules. Today’s enemy erases the forward edge of the battle area and fails to recognize boundaries. Regardless of the new enemy, the Navy still enjoys operating from CONUS or from the sanctity of blue water. Today’s adversary is mostly incapable of striking our naval forces in their operating environment. Of all the services, the Air Force is the most affected by these new threats and must find new ways to counter them to be an effective fighting force.

### **Doctrinal Significance**

The intent of this project is to answer the question, “are the security forces optimally organized to counter future threats, symmetrical and asymmetrical, to the Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) to make it a viable military instrument of power?”

In searching for the answer, this project will examine the history of air base defense (force protection as we knew it then) and how the Air Force as an institution has responded to the air base defense needs. In studying the history, the reader will be able to

see how and why air base defense doctrine was formed and be able to relate today's force protection policies to experiences of the past. Extremely important in any historical study is to identify cyclic patterns and bring to the surface those specific actions that perpetuate repeating mistakes, especially those mistakes that cause loss of life and those that, if prevented, could insure successful employment and redeployment of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF).

In Chapter Three, similarities between the Marine Barracks bombing in Lebanon in 1983 and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996 will be identified. The reader should deduce from this chapter that organizational changes, based on recommendations from the Long Commission in 1983, accompanied by strong leadership involvement could have prevented the 1996 incident.

Chapter Four will briefly look at the strategic environment of the post cold war era and the type of threats that come with that environment. Based on input from scholars, military and civilian experts, future threats to AEFs will be predicted. On examining current threats, some Department of Defense and Air Force countermeasures will be highlighted, including the most recent changes made as a result of the Khobar Towers tragedy. In some fashion, all 81 recommendations from the Downing report were addressed. This project looked at the predicted threats and countermeasures and concluded that although taking steps in the right direction, the Air Force has yet to turn the corner to make the changes that will have lasting affect on 21<sup>st</sup> Century warfare, whether conventional or nonconventional.


Chapter Five will postulate an alternative to current doctrine and organization, including peace and wartime operation pros and cons. This project will conclude by

highlighting key points discovered in researching this information and postulate for change in Air Force doctrine to rank force protection equivalent to air and space superiority. Throughout, this project will attempt to tie the value of force protection to the national security strategy, national military strategy, and the Air Force mission. (See Figures 1 and 2.)


## **Limitations**

Since the Khobar Towers attack and the fallout from the administrative actions taken against the 4404<sup>th</sup> (P) wing commander, fear of culpable liability has forced every commander to include all aspects of force protection into an operation, from water purification to stand-off attacks. This is a result both of fear of reprisals should something happen on their watch and trying to capitalize on the extra force protection money generated as a result of the attack. A danger in this ‘fear’ is that force protection will become the mission. If that becomes the case, the job for which the military was dispatched will not get done. Because so many aspects of today’s operation are considered a force protection issue, this project will limit its look to three issues: 1) how intelligence support to force protection is vital to its success; 2) how the Air Force is organized to facilitate intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination for force protection missions; and 3) how a failure in this arena can affect Air Force viability as the National Command Authority’s instrument of power of choice to carry out the National Security Strategy.

If there is a single message the reader should glean from this project, it is this: the Air Force must be willing to undergo a major mindset change in order to make a lasting affect on the EAF’s security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.



**Figure 1 How Force Protection failure effects the National Security Strategy**



**Figure 2 How Force Protection failure affects the Air Force's viability as a military Instrument of Power**

#### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, September 1997, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Master Sergeant Clif Lewis, Mitchell Battlelab Initiative, Force Protection 2010. slide presentation. Jan 1999.

<sup>3</sup> AFDD 1, p. 19.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Why We Are the Way We Are**

*“We learn from experience that men never learn anything from experience.”*

— George Bernard Shaw

Past experiences have served to shape our ideology and reinforce the way we do business in the United States Air Force, especially in defending air bases. Since the Air Force became a separate service, its focus has been primarily on the pilots, planes and how we fly them in war. And in only one of the four cases in this chapter does this primary focus fall short of being satisfactory...Vietnam. This chapter will examine how air base defense doctrine was forged on the front lines in Southeast Asia and how the lack of emphasis from the main stream Air Force has contributed to the force protection issues of today's EAF.

### **The World Wars**

The value of airpower during World War I was still quite unknown. Because of that, enemy leadership paid no particular attention to air assets. Warfare was being conducted by ‘conventional’ means...the infantry! “Due to the trench warfare that occurred in World War I, no guerillas, insurgents or other irregular combatants disturbed the security of air bases or other rear area installations. Consequently, air base security measures

never progressed beyond the venerable interior guard system.”<sup>1</sup> No threat, no reason to defend. Since there was no impetus for change, status quo prevailed.

Increased technology and capabilities catapulted air power from an afterthought to the forefront of warfare in World War II. It soon became a center of gravity, one with which the US/Allies could attack the enemy and one that became so vital to the defeat of the German forces that it needed defending. The German blitzkrieg established a successful pattern of attacking and capturing air bases on the continent of Europe. With the seizure of Malme and Crete in 1941, British Prime Minister William Churchill wrote in a 29 June 1941 memo to the Secretary of State for Air and Chief of Air Staff, “Every man in Air Force uniform ought to be armed with something—a rifle, a tommy-gun, a pistol, a pike or a mace; and every one, without exception should do at least one hour’s drill and practice every day. Every airman should have his place in the defence scheme.”<sup>2</sup> He went on to specify the frequency of exercises and each man’s response time to his assigned post. “90 per cent should be at their fighting stations in five minutes at the most.”<sup>3</sup>

Britain’s response to the vulnerabilities of their air bases was the creation of the Royal Air Force Regiment. The Regiment peaked at 85,000 officers and airmen and still exists today. The British action to place emphasis on air base defense is important in that it prompted the United States to do the same, although emphasis seems much too strong a word for the American action. “On 12 February 1942, General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, approved an apportionment of 53,299 blacks to the Army Air Forces with ‘the stipulation that air base defense units for the number of the air bases found necessary be organized and Negro personnel be used for this purpose as

required.”<sup>4</sup> With the known prejudices of the United States in the 1940s, one must question the sincerity of the above action. Was this action a military consideration or a racial olive branch?

Great Britain’s sincerity was driven by contextual elements in that their country had, in fact, been bombed by the German war machine and was much more vulnerable to an airfield attack. The United States, on the other hand, had still not experienced an insurgent attack on an airfield. Throughout WWII, both in Europe and the Pacific, with a few small exceptions in China, the United States airfields never came under ground attacks.

Having never experienced a need to defend an air base, the United States dismissed the idea. This laissez-faire attitude carried over into the Air Force when it became a separate service. Once separate from the Army, non-infantry trained units were used to secure the fields. (In fact, the Army and the Air Force agreed in writing that each would be responsible for its own installation security.) With the huge post-WWII drawdown and no perceived threat, the Air Force reverted to its old ways—“the venerable interior guard system.” Ergo the name, *Air Police*. And, in actuality, this worked!

## **Korea**

Korea proved indifferent to the previous wars. “Although 32,000 to 35,000 North Korean guerillas were operating in United Nation’s territory, they ignored air bases as key targets.”<sup>5</sup> With this unscathable mindset that is based on experience, the United States enters Vietnam immune to enemy threat. The enemy proved them wrong.



## **Vietnam: Doctrine By Fire**

Knee-deep into the Cold War and worried about the expansion of Communism, the United States entered the Republic of Vietnam in an advisory role. That role soon expanded and for the first time in history, the United States found itself vulnerable to airfield attacks. No longer did expanses of water and typical warfare lines of demarcation protect their forces. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army forces attacked USAF main operating bases 475 times between 1964 and 1973. Those attacks destroyed 99 US and Vietnamese aircraft and damaged another 1,170.<sup>6</sup> During the same period, the United States only lost 62 to enemy MIGs. The first base attack occurred at Bien Hoa in 1964 and from that point, it became obvious the United States faced a new task...air base defense.

The memorandum signed with the US Army in 1947 came back to haunt the Air Force in Vietnam. Without infantry support and facing threats to their operational mission, the Air Force, in 1965, *reluctantly* accepted the role of securing their own air bases. The Air Force's first response was to throw manpower at the problem. Men and equipment were shipped to the combat zone, but for what reason?

Hampered by a lack of doctrine, troops on the ground had no guidance on how to organize, train or equip base defense forces. With no base of experience, organizational structure tended to mirror stateside units that were designed for CONUS contingencies found in the Cold War. A formal organizational structure began to evolve throughout Vietnam and each base 'personalized' their structure by adapting through trial, error, and necessity, an organization to meet its local need. Regardless of what each unit looked

like, the need for ground intelligence, logistics and civil engineering became necessary to the success of security police operations.

Changes at the unit level were made out of necessity (survival), but did nothing to perpetuate the creation of air base defense doctrine. In order for those long lasting changes to occur, higher headquarters needed to address the base defense role. Seventh Air Force answered the call. The most noteworthy of these changes occurred when the base defense mission's priority was moved into the operational arena. "Previously under the direction of the Inspector General and performing duties as a conventional staff agency, the numerous air field attacks during the Tet Offensive thrust the 7<sup>th</sup> Air Force Security Police Directorate into an operational role. The Director of Security Police came to play in ground defense operations a role much like that of the Director of Operations in aerial offensive ones." <sup>7</sup> Out of this, came the Seventh Air Force Base Defense Operation Center (BDOC). This concept cascaded through every level, from the Numbered Air Force to the smallest of the major bases in Vietnam. It was the focal point for all base defense operations in Vietnam and is still used today.

Several parallel evolutions were taking place while units in theater were trying to sort out the base defense organization. The personnel system, putting faces to spaces, and establishing training requirements for base defenders posed problems that caused the defense forces in theater to suffer.

There were not enough security policemen to man the CONUS operations and the increasing requirements in Vietnam. The personnel center had to rely on other career fields to supply the manpower. To meet their needs, likely due to lack of individual qualification requirements or specific guidance from the security police, the personnel

center would send recent cross-trainees to Vietnam. In general, these airmen were not trained in combat skills and piece-mealed into the theater.

To the security police in Vietnam, there was no problem with this...at first! They needed manpower. But to the trained eye or a small unit tactician, it was a disaster waiting to happen. US Army LTC Theodore Williams critiqued the USAF ground defense system by saying, "Security police are deployed as individuals, much as a peacetime interior guard along the base perimeter, without unit integrity. Yet they have been required repeatedly to fight, as small tactical units, locally superior hostile tactical forces. Reserves, used to counter attack, block and/or reinforce engaged elements, are composed of individual airmen from base engineers, maintenance, and other flying support elements largely untrained for tactical operations, loosely organized in provisional augmentation units. To the tactical ground officer, problems inherent in such procedures are obvious; however, it has taken bitter experience, often at high cost in lives and air resources, to illustrate this lesson." <sup>8</sup> (The "Downing Report" criticized eighteen years later, individual rotations of security police after 19 Americans were killed in the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers.) Not until the development of the Safe Side Program in 1968 did the personnel system deploy forces together like the army infantry units.

The challenges did not end just because a manpower slot was authorized and a person was in that authorized slot. That person had to be trained and ready to fight! At the time, the Air Force had no ground combat skills training. It was a new Air Force responsibility and no mechanism existed. The majority of the training took place once the troop arrived. On-the-job training, especially in a hostile theater, proved very inefficient. It took too long and too much additional manpower to get the airmen

prepared to face the rigors of defensive ground combat. “More than 8 months passed before this process began to turn out forces that showed elementary skills in executing their unit missions.”<sup>9</sup> This was three-fourths of the airman’s entire tour before he had the necessary skills to do his job. One officer, who arrived in Bien Hoa just in time for the Tet Offensive, “scorned” the treatment by the personnel system. He was taken from another career field and sent to Vietnam with no training or idea what a security police officer did. He said, “I do not think Vietnam is the place for anyone in a position of authority to start from scratch in a new career field.”<sup>10</sup> Because air base defense was a new concept and mission, it took several trials and errors to establish an efficient system that provided support to forward-deployed forces.

### **Ground Intelligence**

As previously mentioned, units were organized to best meet their mission and the need for ground intelligence was ever present. Local ground defense officials had to have tactical ground intelligence to know what security alert conditions to set, when to deploy contingency forces and how to counter the enemy before he attacked.<sup>11</sup> As a result of the stinging attacks during Tet, Seventh Air Force saw the need for having an intelligence system organic to the base defense role and directed that each security police squadron support an intelligence section. Not able or not willing to go to higher headquarters, the requirement from the numbered air force (NAF) was never backed up with manpower authorizations. No authorizations meant no requirement for formalized training. In order to meet this NAF requirement, already short-manned security police commanders were forced, if they had not already done so, to take a security policeman off a fire team or from the line of defense and create an intelligence section. As a means

of survival, these unauthorized and untrained security policemen exhausted all Allied sources in an attempt to predict threats to the major bases.

Enemy standoff attacks against Tan Son Nhut during the Tet Offensive forced Seventh Air Force to employ aerial reconnaissance photography in support of base defense. The Seventh Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence asked PACAF for 50 more photo interpreters but was turned down. With that request denied, ground defense intelligence suffered significantly. Other sources had to be found.

This is where the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) stepped up to the task and became a vital part of the base defense system. Taking an already existent Area Source Program (ASP), which was originally designed to be an advisor to the Vietnamese Air Force, they expanded its role to include human intelligence for defensive purposes. It evolved to become the “most fruitful source of base defense information.”<sup>12</sup> It was a simple structure that focused on acquiring information related to the plans and order of battle of the enemy forces within the stand off zones of the Air Force bases. For the Air Force, it was their only ground intelligence source. This soon became the most popular information in theater, not only with the Air Force, but also across the spectrum of the Department of Defense. Their workload and the demand for their product significantly increased. “From August 1968 through November 1969, ASP generated 78.3% of all DOD intelligence information and 84.1% of the total items in the report.”<sup>13</sup>

The success of the AFOSI ASP was due to the innovation of a front line forces using skills inherent to their peacetime investigatory skills and adapting them to a wartime environment. The operational success of the Area Source Program was so strong, PACAF/SP, in May 1968, directed that a security police intelligence function be created.

PACAF directed security police intelligence sections to be responsible for local intelligence from the base to 30 kilometers out. “Within this area the mission was to cement ties with Allied intelligence sources, keep up-to-date order of battle on enemy and friendly forces, maintain current threat estimate, act as observers on daily air reconnaissance flights and prepare daily and weekly intelligence summaries.”<sup>14</sup> Though more specific in their direction than Seventh Air Force, PACAF funded no additional manpower, but the doctrine train was moving.

Eventually, by having a requirement from higher headquarters, some security policemen were sent to the US Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabud, MD. This proved to be a great first step, but not enough to satisfy the need. Experience in the two-man deep sections was soon denigrated by the frequent rotation in and out of Vietnam. The Air Force realized the need to train more and eventually, each unit was assigned one trained officer and one trained NCO, but still carried no authorizations on the books.

Finally, doctrinal headway was being made. The need for organic ground intelligence was realized, training was being accomplished and fruits of these men’s labor prevented, or at least diminished, airfield attacks. The one obstacle yet to overcome was receiving authorizations to do the job. In 1970, six years after the first attack on a US air base, and two years after the Tet Offensive rained destruction onto US air bases, the Seventh Air Force Director of Intelligence passed along to his Air Staff counterpart that the intelligence system for base defense was “efficient”. He wrote, “no changes are required at either headquarters or base level in the intelligence function as related to base defense.”<sup>15</sup> With one fell swoop of a pen, one man who could have changed the course

of force protection, sealed the fate of organic ground intelligence in the Air Force for the next several decades.

Of course, this stance was contrary to the security police point of view. Many exceptional security policemen were being employed in the base defense intelligence sections and providing information necessary to protect from enemy attack, but it took away from the unit's front line manpower. Ground intelligence was a force multiplier in Vietnam but it was felt that authorized, trained intelligence experts could have multiplied the force saving more lives, weapon systems and money. The Seventh AF Director of Security Police wrote as part of his after action report that security police were "plunged into the intelligence business in Vietnam not out of any desire to build empires, but because [the] mission made it absolutely necessary. Evaluation of the entire program reveals that it would be in the best interest of the USAF if the Air Base Defense Combat Intelligence needs could be met by an accommodation with intelligence experts. This will undoubtedly provide a superior product and would free a sizeable number of security police to perform their primary mission."<sup>16</sup>

The emphasis placed on air base defense by Seventh Air Force, and to an extent PACAF, was not shared by Headquarters Air Force. They were more concerned with securing Strategic Air Command's nuclear arsenal and other CONUS bases that supported the Cold War mission. The limited war in Southeast Asia was just that—limited—and so became the doctrine.

Vietnam was the most important event in recent military history for the USAF Security Forces. It provided the "doctrine by fire" that is the foundation of today's air base defense doctrine. Today's doctrine has change so insignificantly, organizational

structures from Vietnam could be transposed over today's and it would almost match perfectly. In fact, the 820<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Group, today's answer to force protection for the AEF, is organized very similar to the Safe Side Program created during Vietnam. Safe Side lasted about three years before national security strategy and budget cuts caused its inactivation. Today's security forces beret crest is identical to the Safe Side beret shield. Unquestionably, we are living with the successes and mistakes made in Vietnam.

### **Operation Desert Storm**

As a whole, OPERATION Desert Storm was an air base defense anomaly. Organizationally, the security police were deployed and employed by typical unit type codes that originated, at least in structure, during Vietnam. During the war, there were no significant non-conventional attacks on US/Coalition forces. While travelling between an air base and a housing area, a bus carrying Coalition forces was assaulted by gunfire with only minor injuries and there were a few reported instances of gunfire along the perimeter of one or two bases. The only confirmed episode was due to local Bedouins with no hostile intent. It was reported as a form of "greeting".

Though somewhat void of non-conventional threats, OPERATION Desert Storm was significant in forming the author's opinion of the need for an organization that provides organic intelligence to the security police. As a member of a security police headquarters element (Base Defense Operation Center), the author deployed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from September 1990 to March 1991. The ground defense intelligence responsibility was assigned to a security police captain and technical sergeant whose training began once they arrived in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO).



Security measures were extremely tight around the housing compound, even more so than at the aerodrome. The ground defense force commander commented, “I don’t want a repeat of the Marine Barracks bombing.” His actions were based totally on knowledge of history vice intelligence information received.

The S-2 Section sourced information from every possible venue, the air intelligence section, the 2d Military Intelligence Battalion, the 3/43 Air Defense Artillery and the OSI assigned to the wing. Human intelligence at the installation was non-existent or was not shared with the security police. The daily briefings to the ground defense force commander generally consisted of SKUD Missile threats and capabilities, the air order of battle, and once the war started, battle damage assessment. Although great ‘gee whiz’ information, it was relatively useless information if we had faced ground threat from non-conventional forces. Though untrained in analysis, this section used the material available and predicted several likely friendly movements, including the likelihood of the “left hook” move into Iraqi. The total success of the military operations in the Gulf War sealed in the minds of the American people and military leadership an invincibility, which contributed to the landmark force protection case discussed in the next chapter, Khobar Towers.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam*, (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Alan Vick, *Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest*, (Santa Monica, CA, Project Air Force, RAND, 1979), 111.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Vick, 111.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Fox, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>6</sup> Vick, 68.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 81

## Notes

<sup>8</sup> LTC Theodore C. Williams, *US Air Force Ground Defense System*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1968) 16.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in Fox, 79.

<sup>10</sup> Fox, 85.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>12</sup> Quoted in Fox, 141.

<sup>13</sup> Fox, 142.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 143.

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in Fox, 144.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 145.

## Chapter 3

### Deadly Mistakes

*The terrorist threat to U.S. military forces is real. Opponents of U.S. policy cannot engage the United States directly, but can employ terrorism to conduct strategic attacks against U.S. servicemen and women deployed in foreign countries. This threat can be countered through concerted efforts at all levels to plan, prepare, and enforce force protection measures. Our vulnerabilities can be overcome. It will take energy, command, attention, and resources.*

—Wayne A. Downing  
General, US Army (retired)

Though not an Air Force operation, the terrorist bombing of the Marine Barracks in Lebanon is a landmark case for anyone conducting Aerospace Expeditionary Force planning. Whether it is a Marine Expeditionary Force or Air Expeditionary Force, the threat is on the ground and that is where the threat must be countered. Douhet said of airpower, “it is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air.”<sup>1</sup> Again, Marine eggs or Air Force eggs are immaterial. The enemy in Beirut saw the Marine Barracks as a nest and struck with deadly accuracy. This chapter will examine two of the United States’ force protection failures, the Marine Barracks bombing in Lebanon in 1983 and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and the causal similarities that exist between the two.

## **Lebanon**

Since its inception, the United States Marine Corps have been called upon by our nation to fulfill an expeditionary role. Nicknamed “America’s 9-1-1-Force”; the Corps is capable of rapid response to areas and situations where conventional forces would otherwise be rendered useless or inefficient at the least. They are highly trained and have performed with the greatest valor and heroism in some of the most difficult areas and situations the world has placed before them.

US Marines were deployed into Lebanon on 29 September 1982 as part of a multinational force. British, French, Italian forces joined the United States. “The mission of the US contingent of the multinational force (USMNF) was to establish an environment that would facilitate the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Lebanon and assist the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces in establishing sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area.”<sup>2</sup>

From September 1982 to the spring of 1983, the USMNF enjoyed a warm welcome and benign environment. That peace was shattered in April 1983 when a pick-up truck carrying several thousand pounds of TNT was delivered to the US Embassy. The Embassy was destroyed by a massive explosion that took the lives of 17 US citizens and over 40 others. Tensions in the region grew and “on 23 October 1983, a truck laden with the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed through the perimeter of the compound of the US contingent of the Multinational Force at Beirut International Airport, Beirut, Lebanon, penetrated the Battalion Landing Team HQ building and detonated. The force of the explosion destroyed the building resulting in the deaths of 241 US military personnel.”<sup>3</sup>

The DOD commissioned a team to investigate circumstances and actions surrounding the 23 October attack. The Commission found that periodically, from deployment through the 23 October bombing, certain events indicating increased hostility toward USMNF occurred. “The threat confronting the USMNF evolved incrementally to its present alarming state.”<sup>4</sup> Intelligence assessments divided the threat to the USMNF into two large categories: conventional military action and terrorists tactics. The Commission notes that intelligence support to conventional military requirements received praise. Hostile artillery and mechanized positions along with militia strongholds were located with ease. Getting terrorist threat information, however, was a different story. The inability for the system to identify specific terrorist threats proved fatal. “The Commission concluded that although the USMNF commander received a large volume of intelligence warnings concerning potential terrorist threats prior to 23 October 1983, he was not provided with the timely intelligence, tailored to his specific operational needs, that was necessary to defend against the broad spectrum of threats he faced.”<sup>5</sup>

Several reasons existed why vital information failed to be provided to the ground force commander. First and foremost, the military intelligence system was not geared toward collection, analysis, and dissemination of local source intelligence for wartime. Programs like the Area Source Program created by the AFOSI in Vietnam died once the demand went away. Likewise, other services saw no need for development of this capability.

Other reasons why information did not reach the commander include source protection and stovepiping information. Source protection within the intelligence community is probably the most sensitive of all concerns. Releasing certain source-

generated information equates to divulging the source. Stovepiping of information from source to analysis within an organization without broad dissemination has also caused tactical decision-makers not to get timely intelligence. The Commission concluded that this obstacle existed in Lebanon (a Downing Report finding as well) and prevented the ground commander from receiving vital information. “It should be noted that the FBI report on the 18 April 1983 bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, a report which described the use of explosive-activated bottle bombs in that incident stayed within FBI, CIA, and Department of State channels.”<sup>6</sup> The significance of this report is that the information provided concerned the “blast multiplier” effect of the bomb as well as other specifics that could have assisted ground forces in predicting a threat to the Marine Barracks.

Analyzing this scenario, one can see how the nonconventional threats to the USMNF are similar to the ones US Forces face today and in the future. Like the 21<sup>st</sup> Century’s EAF, operating from an established airfield, the USMNF was operating in a built-up environment and in the case of the USMNF, “without any way of pursuing the accuracy of data in order to head off attack.” The Commission notes that (in 1983) US intelligence’s primary focuses supported air and naval forces engaged in Cold War operations and that “significant attention must be given by the entire US intelligence structure to purging and refining of masses of generalized information into intelligence analysis useful to small unit commanders.”<sup>7</sup> It is vital to point out that the Commission was writing on the USMC whose *raison d’être* is ground operations and whose livelihood is based on small unit success.

The Air Force, whose success is based on putting steel on target through airpower, and whose history has shown an aversion to ground operations, would endure similar criticism thirteen years later when a like-commission would investigate a terrorist attack that took 19 American lives.

## **Khobar Towers**

Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, coalition forces have had to maintain a presence in the Gulf region. North and South no-fly zones were established to enforce the treaty signed following the war and to prevent Saddam Hussein from using aircraft to attack his own people who took up arms against him.

American military presence comes neither cheap nor light. Near Dhahran, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the Khobar Towers compound housed almost 3,000 US military personnel of the 4404<sup>th</sup> Air Wing (Provisional) along with military members from other coalition forces. In November 1995, five Americans were killed in a bombing attack in Riyadh, KSA. Seven months later, a truck bomb exploded near the Khobar Towers compound. The Defense Special Weapons Agency classified the explosion equivalent to more than 20,000 pounds of TNT. In a report to the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry synthesizes the event.

“Shortly before 10:00 PM local time on Tuesday, June 25, 1996, a fuel truck parked next to the northern perimeter fence at the Khobar Towers complex. Air Force guards posted on top of the closest building, Building 131, immediately spotted the truck and suspected a bomb as its driver fled the scene in a nearby car. The guards began to evacuate the building, but were unable to complete this task before a tremendous explosion occurred. The blast completely destroyed the northern face of the building,

blew out windows from surrounding buildings, and was heard for miles. Nineteen American service members were killed and hundreds more were seriously injured. Many Saudis and other nationals were also injured.”<sup>8</sup>

The Department of Defense commissioned a team to investigate circumstances and actions surrounding the 25 June attack. The Downing Assessment Task Force noted 26 findings and 81 recommendations. In the report cover letter to the Secretary of Defense, General, USA (ret) Wayne A Downing wrote: “There was a general warning of an attack on Khobar Towers, but the information was not sufficiently precise to determine its exact timing or method. This can and must be improved through closer coordination with host nation and other agencies and more intense emphasis on human intelligence.”<sup>9</sup>

Again, the United States fell victim to an enemy who successfully employed unconventional warfare. The target, like in 1983, was again a US forces’ living quarters, in close proximity to a street (avenue of approach) and the method used was a vehicle loaded with explosives. Several other similarities on how the leadership reacted to available intelligence information exist as well.

For this study’s sake, Findings 9 and 11 of the Downing Report will be highlighted.

**FINDING 9:** *The ability of the theater and nation intelligence community to conduct in-depth, long term analysis of trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists is deficient.*<sup>10</sup>

Relate this finding to the “Long Commission” report that said, “Throughout the period of the USMNF presence in Lebanon, intelligence sources were unable to provide proven, accurate, definitive information on terrorist tactics against our forces.”<sup>11</sup> It is not the collectors’ fault, nor the analysts, nor the briefer's fault that the information did not



get to the right person at the right time. It is a systemic problem that must be attacked beginning with the mindset, then changing the organization to meet the needs of the user.

Emanating from Finding 9 is Finding 11 which is the crux of this study's thesis:

**FINDING 11:** *The lack of an organic intelligence support capability in US Air Force Security Police units adversely affects their ability to accomplish the base defense mission.*

US Air Force Security Police do not have a dedicated, organic intelligence element to support operations in a high-threat, air base defense environment. The Security Police units depend on a combination of the local Air Force Office of Special Investigations Detachment and the Wing Intelligence staff to provide their intelligence. The AFOSI focuses on intelligent collection, liaison with host country officials, assessing physical vulnerabilities, and advising the Wing Commander and other installation officials. The Wing Intelligence staff focuses on support to the operational flying mission, in this case, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, as its highest and most time consuming priority. The Wing Intelligence staff does not commit analytic resources to the Security Police base defense mission.<sup>12</sup>

Once again, words from 1970 must be reiterated, “no changes are required at either headquarters or base level in the intelligence function as related to base defense.”<sup>13</sup> The report also highlighted that the security police commander was acting as his own intelligence officer. Because of his responsibilities and austere manning levels, he had very little time to dedicate to intelligence gathering or analysis.

This chapter concludes with excerpts taken directly from the reports that investigated the two bombings.

“The Commission further concludes that the HUMINT support to the USMNF commander was ineffective, being neither precise nor tailored to his needs. The Commission believes that the paucity of US controlled HUMINT provided to the USMNF commander is in largest part due to policy decisions which have resulted in a

US HUMINT capability commensurate with the resources and time that have been spent to acquire it. The Commission further recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to establish a joint CIA/DOD examination of policy and resource alternatives to immediately improve HUMINT support to the USMNF contingent in Lebanon and other areas of potential conflict which would involve US military operating forces.<sup>14</sup>

**“The Intelligence Community Provided Warning of the Potential for a Terrorist Attack.** US intelligence did not predict the precise attack on Khobar Towers. Commander did have warning that the terrorist threat to US Service members and facilities was increasing. DOD elements in the theater had the authority, but were not exploiting all potential sources of information. Human Intelligence is probably the only source of information that can provide tactical details of a terrorist attack. The US intelligence community must have the requisite authorities and invest more time, people, and funds into developing HUMINT against the terrorist threat.”<sup>15</sup>

The system must change for any expeditionary force to be successful. The threats are real and continuous and tactics must change to address the threats. Chapter Four will address these threats and what current countermeasures are in place and whether or not they are enough.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Guilio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 53.

<sup>2</sup> Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act. *Report of the Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 23 October 1983* (Washington, D.C., 20 December 1983), 2.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., preface.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 65.

## Notes

<sup>8</sup> William J. Perry, *Report to the President*, (Washington, D.C.O Department of Defense, 1996), 1.

<sup>9</sup> Downing Assessment Task Force, *Force Protection Assessment US CENTCOM and Khobar Towers*, Vol. 1Report 30 Aug 1996., Cover letter

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., xiii.

<sup>11</sup> Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 64.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>13</sup> Fox, 144

<sup>14</sup> Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 66.

<sup>15</sup> Downing Assessment Task Force, viii.

## Chapter 4

### **Expeditionary Threats and Current Countermeasures**

*The single greatest factor which the US will face in the emerging order is its role as the greatest uncontested military power.*

—Dr. Karl P. Magyar

Still floundering in the victory of the Cold War, the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers served as a definitive “wake-up call” to the United States leadership and population. For over three decades, the United States’ security strategy was containment in a bi-polar world; a strategy that fell with the Berlin Wall. Assessing the “New World Order” became quite a task for the United States, especially since it was in a presidential transition, not only between presidents of different parties, but presidents of different generations.

In 1996, Zalmay Khalilzad, in a RAND study chastised the United States’ policy makers. “Five years after the end of the Cold War, however, no new paradigm or grand design has emerged...where is the United States going?”<sup>1</sup> It was apparent, in many ways, the United States military, at the direction of their civilian leadership, operated in a hit or miss fashion. There was the resounding military success of the Persian Gulf War that employed Cold War forces against a much less formidable opponent. Two years later, a terrible, miscalculated enemy overwhelmed the American military in Somalia that resulted in the withdrawal of forces from that specific region. Indeed, where was the US

going? At the time Khalilzad saw the US having three choices: 1) neo-isolationism, where the US abandons global preeminence and turns inward to face domestic problems; 2) allow multi-polarity, where the balance of power would be spread among several nations to preclude the emergence of a superpower competitor to the US; and 3) global leadership in that the US seeks to maintain a position of global leadership, precluding both the rise of another global rival and multi-polarity. He noted the US eventually had to choose a direction. If not, the country would “lack a standard for judging conflicts and crises that do not threaten the US homeland.”<sup>2</sup>

With the publication of the *National Security Strategy for a New Century* in October 1998, the US made its decision. “Today’s complex security environment demands that all our instruments of national power be effectively integrated to achieve our security objectives. We must have the demonstrated will and capabilities to continue to exert *global leadership* and remain the preferred security partner for the community of states that share our interests.”<sup>3</sup>

The Strategy acknowledges increased threats with globalization and urges governments at all levels and departments within each level to work together to “protect our citizens and critical infrastructures” at home. The Strategy also acknowledges that global leadership is more risky to American lives abroad, but weighs those risks against whether they advance long term American interests.

Under this strategy, the U.S. military will be called upon to respond to various crises. Some will be to protect national vital interests, some to demonstrate U.S. resolve and some just to reaffirm the United States’ role as a global leader. Each of these tasks require their own type of military response...from fighting and winning major theater

wars to conducting small scale contingency operations to deterring aggression or coercing in a crisis.

Armed with fewer planes and personnel, the United States Air Force conceptualized its structure for the new century around an expeditionary force. The Aerospace Expeditionary Force is a smaller, capabilities-based force that focuses on global engagement and full spectrum shaping that can respond rapidly and operate from bare bases with a limited infrastructure. With the logistics footprint significantly reduced, only the bare minimum will be initially taken to forward operating locations. The support infrastructure will be significantly reduced and a heavy reliance on contractor support increased. For the commander, depending on the threat, this is a force protection nightmare.

Look at the following example. An AEF is deployed. The size of the aerodrome will remain the same as in years past to accommodate aircraft operations. The threat, due to the world environment has increased. The eyes and ears available to protect deployed forces have decreased. Under this concept, force protection's role increases proportionally in importance and difficulty. So how is the force protected in this situation? One answer comes from the past. "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."<sup>4</sup> By knowing the enemy threats and their own vulnerabilities, the Air Force can adjust operations accordingly, whether that is air tactics or sizing the security forces package to meet the situational threat.

## **Threats and Vulnerabilities**

Once the United States chose a direction, an assessment of the threats and vulnerabilities in that direction could now be analyzed. There have been several force

protection successes, many about which the general population knows nothing and relatively few failures, however, the failures are what gets the media attention either through mass destruction, mass casualties or both. One of the greatest threats to the AEF concept is the *will* to employ it knowing the risks involved. Enemies attack the American will and resolve to maintain continued policy through terror, perceived or real, and killing American military and civilians.

Since the end of the Cold War, and even before, when the United States ventured forcefully into the third world, it has struggled with the idea of losing American lives over something other than what is classified as a vital interest. Whether post-1968 Vietnam, the Marine Barracks or Khobar Towers, the American public's will to place their sons and daughters in harm's way has been the most vulnerable center of gravity. General Downing writes, "Some of the enemies believe that our greatest vulnerability is the American intolerance for casualties in the pursuit of objectives that often do not have an apparent direct link to vital national objectives."<sup>5</sup> Another case that supports this premise is Somalia. The deaths of the 18 Rangers and having a body of a US service member dragged through the streets impacted the nation such that forces were soon withdrawn from the region without accomplishing the assigned mission. (Refer to Figure 1, page 5, to correlate how the will of the people affects our military strategy.)

From history and thoughtful speculation, one can summate the enemy's conduct used to change the will of the American people will be by creating casualties "whether from attacks like the one on Khobar Towers or more discrete attacks designed to establish a pattern of insecurity and helplessness, allows an enemy to demonstrate US vulnerabilities at overseas locations and achieve his political aims through indirect means."<sup>6</sup>

The National Security Strategy is based on the support of the American population and the legislative body. “Engagement abroad depends on the willingness of the American people and the Congress to bear the costs of defending U.S. interests—in dollars, energy and, when there is no alternative, the risk of losing American lives.”<sup>7</sup>

Twenty-first Century expeditionary operations whether combative, humanitarian, or other, according to a draft paper formulated by the Air Force Force Protection Battlelab, will likely see the following threats:

- Terrorists
- Extremist groups or individuals
- Domsday cults
- Cyber-terrorists and technology enhanced collection methods
- Biological/chemical agents in attacks
- Radioactive materials with explosives
- Drug traffickers and criminals
- Hostile civilian populations
- Unmanned air/ground vehicles
- Suicide bombers and aircraft<sup>8</sup>

Having a good idea what targets are likely to be hit (people) and what tools are going to be used (see above), one may think it easy to stop aggressive actions against US forces, but every situation is different. From the culture to the terrain, protection measures must be adaptive. One constant will remain...specificity on when and where attacks will occur.

Each case studied in this paper refers to the intelligence support, specifically the ability to collect, analyze and disseminate human intelligence. The EAF will be called upon to enter various theaters, some friendly, some not. Some, like Lebanon in 1983, will be friendly at first, then develop into a hostile environment. Especially in this type of situation, where the circumstances put the forces at ease, human intelligence is vital to



change the mindset of those in theater to be more on guard. For the AEF concept to be a viable tool of the National Military Strategy, threats to people and sortie generation must be pre-empted before they occur or at the least, neutralized at the time of action.

## **Countermeasures**

More attention has been given to the asymmetrical threats the United States faces under *global leadership* since the Downing Assessment Task Force published the results of the investigation on the Khobar Towers bombing. Several of the recommendations have been adapted within the Department of Defense and all have been ‘acted on.’ For instance, a new office within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was created to focus specifically on force protection. “The JCS group clarified who had the force protection authority for deployed forces and dependents in each region, publishing doctrine and standards to guide local commanders and acting as a catalyst for finding or developing technology to enhance force protection.”<sup>9</sup> Brigadier General James T. Conway, the office’s first director said all 81 recommendations coming from the Downing Report were acted on within a year.

Another initiative implemented as a Downing recommendation was awareness training. A four-level training system was developed to provide terrorist threat information to all levels of the force. Level I training focuses on the individual troop who is about to deploy abroad. Level II training targets NCOs and officers who will teach force protection in their respective services. The level and type of training is geared toward the threat each specific service may face. Levels III and IV are designed specifically for unit commanders and senior leaders on whose shoulders the responsibility fall to implement the new anti-terrorist provisions.

Significant changes took place within the security police career field. The three Air Force Specialty Codes inherent to the security police were combined into one under the security forces. Specialties such as law enforcement, combat arms training and maintenance and security now had to focus on all aspects of the combined career field. 'Forces' replaced the word 'police' which seemingly appeared insignificant on the surface changed the career field's focus on every aspect of their job. The 'police' function of the security forces would remain a task, but would be de-emphasized. To that end, organization, training and equipping of the force changed dramatically.

Organizationally, the Security Forces Center (SFC) at Lackland AFB, TX was created. It included the activation of the 820<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Group, the Air Force's Force Protection Battlelab and the moving of the security forces staff from Kirtland AFB, NM to Lackland. This co-located the SFC with the SF Academy, the military working dog school and the Air Intelligence Agency at Kelly.

At the organizational level, the 820<sup>th</sup> was designed to provide a highly trained, rapidly deployable "first-in" force protection unit. Col Larry A. Buckingham, the unit's first commander said of his unit's capability, "The 820<sup>th</sup> gives the Air Force a totally dedicated and integrated composite unit for force protection, drawing from many disciplines, not just security forces. The unit is composed of personnel from security forces, Office of Special Investigations, civil engineering, logistics and supply, communications, intelligence, administration, and medical career fields, giving us the capability to assess each threat accordingly." <sup>10</sup> Though the headquarters is located at Lackland, seven force protection flights will be located throughout the country and are tasked to be able to deploy to anywhere in the world within 48 hours.

Along with the 820<sup>th</sup> in the Security Forces Center is the Force Protection Battlelab (FPB). The FPB was established “to identify innovative concepts for protecting Air Force personnel, facilities, and weapons systems and to rapidly measure their potential worth using field ingenuity, modeling and simulation, and actual employment of exploratory capabilities in operational environments.”<sup>11</sup>

To address the training needs of the new security force member, a Utilization and Training Workshop was convened. This working group developed a mission essential task list (METL) that identified what a security force member, under this new concept, would need to be a proficient 3-level. The resulting METL would take 91-days of instruction, however the security forces academy was only funded for a 51-day class. Tasks were prioritized and the most important were fit into the 51-day curriculum with plans to request additional days during the next program objective memorandum. All law enforcement tasks were cut out of the SF Academy curriculum and the training responsibility was shifted to each airman’s first duty assignment unit. Additionally, fourteen days of distance learning would have to be accomplished within a certain time frame. One can see where, due to the additional emphasis on ‘combat’ skills at the academy, the training requirements on the security force member’s first assignment base increased...no additional training authorizations have been funded as of June 1998.

In addition to the above changes, the Air Force put more money into purchasing technological advances in detection capabilities. The majority of this technology came in the form of tactical ground sensors and night vision devices. This technology was intended as a force multiplier not a force replacer.

Strides were made in the area of counterintelligence as well. The creation of the Antiterrorism Specialty Team (10 OSI agents specially selected and trained to support expeditionary operations) and the integration of intelligence analysts into the 820<sup>th</sup> and the Force Protection Battlelab was a substantial step in the right direction.

Though the organizational make-up of the 820<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Group is on target, the employment concept needs further development as well as several questions answered before the limited countermeasures taken by the Air Force will actually counter the vast methods of attacking an expeditionary force in a strange, new, possibly urban environment. According to their command briefing, the Group will be divided into two teams, Blue and Black. One team will deploy with each of the ten AEFs. These highly trained teams exist with the expectation of being deployed most of the year, but how long can they keep up the pace?

Does the 820<sup>th</sup> have the numbers of personnel with two squadrons to fulfill the commitments of the 10 AEFs and training exercises throughout the world? And if not, will the units at each wing still be tasked thereby driving the personnel tempo higher (or remaining the same)?

The AEF concept is designed around a wing deploying as a team. The theory being that those who train and work together on a daily basis will perform better in war. The introduction of the 820<sup>th</sup> into each AEF would defeat that concept. Would an AEF commander rather deploy with his own security forces leadership or an outside unit?

If the 820<sup>th</sup> takes on all taskers, will all the corporate ground combat skills, from mobilizing to employment, fade from the lead units? The vision is that security forces members will rotate in and out of the 820<sup>th</sup> from regular units. Can the personnel center

make this happen? Air Force members have all experienced a familiar cycle where the Air Force scales back on permanent changes of station due to budget constraints. The ground combat skills knowledge pool would dwindle with each cutback. Furthermore, who at the lead units will be able to step up to the plate if, a government accounting office-type study criticizes the operation because they think 600+ security forces could be used better elsewhere. Budget cuts and a ‘perceived’ lack of need (withdrawal from Vietnam) caused the Safe Side Program’s demise. That type of future cut will leave a significant void at AEF lead bases.

It is much easier to do ‘just-in-time’ training on skills that haven’t been practiced in six months than to retrain those not done in years. The 820<sup>th</sup> provides a tremendous capability that should be used *in conjunction with* lead unit security forces squadrons, not only at the troop level, but *with (not in place of)* the ground defense force commander and the in garrison base defense operation center staff at that wing. If, for instance, Able Squadron, as part of a lead unit was scheduled to deploy and shortfalled an officer and noncommissioned officer from their headquarters element, the 820<sup>th</sup> could provide that support, along with training similar to the Air Mobility Command’s Air Mobility Warfare Center at McGuire AFB, NJ.

Today’s strategic environment makes it necessary to use all available talents and tools. It is the author’s opinion that the Air Force made a mistake during the career field merger by de-emphasizing the police role. Future threats will include terrorist activities, a crime, and require a talent for meshing police intelligence with military intelligence to get the entire ground picture. The Area Source Program in Vietnam used criminal investigative techniques to provide the most beneficial ground intelligence in the theater.

Human intelligence is what police do everyday to prevent or solve crimes and those techniques are just as perishable as setting up a sector communications plan in a bare base operation. The following vignette illustrates this premise.

During Operation Uphold Democracy (October 1994), a military police team from the 988<sup>th</sup> MP Company was conducting a traffic control post as part of a cordon and search operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. While performing the task, two civilians approached the MP team informing them of criminal activity in the neighborhood. During the interview, the MP team prepared a sketch of a house and the surrounding area. The team also obtained information describing the criminals and their weapons. Recognizing the criminal activity was in fact the actions of a political/mercenary group named “FRAP,” the MP team radioed the platoon leader, and forwarded the field interview to higher headquarters. Two days later, a unit from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division raided the house capturing weapons, ammunition, and equipment.<sup>12</sup>

In the Cold War past, police agencies received training from the military. Today’s environment dictates reciprocity. The US Marine Corps and the US Army have recently developed urban warfare centers to train their forces. Law enforcement officers in large cities, especially special weapons teams, have an expertise in this area that could benefit the US military, including the US Air Force Security Forces.

Since becoming a separate service, the Air Force has struggled with the importance of ground intelligence to air operations. The fall of the Soviet Union forced the United States to re-look at their role in the world and the threats it will face. The next chapter will offer a radical organizational change as a possible permanent solution to the ground intelligence support to the Aerospace Expeditionary Force.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, “US Grand Strategies: Implications for the United States and the World.” In *Strategic Appraisal*, 1996. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 11.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>3</sup> The White House. *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, October 1998, 1.

## Notes

<sup>4</sup> Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, London, 1963), 84.

<sup>5</sup> Downing Assessment Task Force, vi.

<sup>6</sup> Downing Assessment Task Force, 7.

<sup>7</sup> National Security Strategy, 3.

<sup>8</sup> Air Force Force Protection Battlelab, "Force Protection for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (FP 21): Meeting the Challenges of Tomorrow's Aerospace Force," (Lackland AFB, TX: Security Forces Center, 1998), 14.

<sup>9</sup> Otto Kreisher, "To Protect the Force." *Air Force Magazine*, November 1998, 33.

<sup>10</sup> Carolyn N. Lyon, "Activation of the 820<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Group." *Security Forces Digest*, 2, issue 1, (March 1998): 24.

<sup>11</sup> Air Force Force Protection Battlelab home page, <http://afsf.lackland.af.mil/Battlelab/index/htm>

<sup>12</sup> United States Army Military Police School White Paper on Police Intelligence Operations, SAMPS White Paper, September 1998,

## Chapter 5

### Radical Changes for Radical Times

*Just as dedicated intelligence staffs support combat flying squadrons in the planning, conduct, and assessment of their missions, so should the Security Police have benefit of an analogous organic capability in the conduct of their combat mission—particularly in a high threat environment, such as Saudi Arabia. The intelligence support for base defense applies to any expeditionary concept.*

—General Wayne A. Downing, US Army (ret)

Actions taken by the Air Force mentioned in Chapter Four, plus others, have been a superb preparation for a first step in a long journey. In order to begin and complete this journey, the Air Force must have a vision of where they are going and the commitment to reach its destination. The vision is complete...the Expeditionary Aerospace Force. The wide range of commitments needed to make this vision happen, however, are just now being realized. In fact, on March 5, 1999, the Air Force announced the service's force structure changes that would facilitate launching the EAF concept. In those myriad of changes is the movement of the 820<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Group to Moody AFB, Georgia with the addition of two squadrons and 540 personnel. For these changes to have the desired effect, the Air Force must first be proactive, not "Khobar reactive", in their force protection mindset.

Changing the Air Force long term mindset on the importance of the principle of war, *security*, is just one of the many facets that have to be accomplished for this force to be



viable against the asymmetrical threats it faces. The environment that the Air Force faces today and in the next few decades is different from anything it has ever faced. It differs from the expeditionary force that fought in Vietnam in that the force as a whole faces these threats, not just one theater of operation in a limited war. Vietnam's air base attacks were directed at tactical air forces as opposed to strategic assets that, at that time, were the Air Force's main focus. Today's Air Force leaders were those tactical aviators in Vietnam. They must remember the lessons learned in Vietnam and apply them to today's expeditionary environment. No more can the Air Force use a Band-Aid to give care to a sucking chest wound.

Once the Air Force fully realizes the importance of the principle of war, *security*, in this environment, organizational changes can be made that will have a lasting effect on all aspects of the mission, small-scale contingencies, deterring aggression and coercion, and fighting and winning major theater wars.

### **Organic Ground Intelligence**

Establishing a ground intelligence capability within the security forces (SF) structure, similar to the 820<sup>th</sup>, but throughout the career field, goes one step further in allowing for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, a task accomplished by US Army forces whenever they take on a mission.

US Army Military Police battalions have an organic intelligence capability and integrate this with their combat arms to better serve the mission. They combine broad-based tactical intelligence with a new concept called Police Intelligence Operations to round out the intelligence needs for the ground commander. "Military Police and CID provide Army, joint, multinational, and interagency personnel with a flexible force

capable of collecting human intelligence (HUMINT). MP and CID collect much of this information as a consequence of performing other unit missions. Consequently, activities that appear to be strictly of a criminal nature need to be evaluated for their impact upon ongoing or proposed operations. Often the whole process of collecting, processing, and exploiting of HUMINT is a cooperative, combined arms effort involving joint, multinational, and interagency forces.”<sup>1</sup> If organized accordingly, the SF could provide the same service for the Air Force’s surface dimension

There are several ways to provide the security forces with this capability. One possibility is to assign an intelligence officer and noncommissioned officer to each SF squadron that is part of an AEF lead wing. These bodies, authorized on the unit manning document (UMD) under the Operations Flight, would perform similar responsibilities as their counterparts in air operations. This concept is not new. SF squadrons carry authorizations from various Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) on their UMD. Examples include Information Management Specialists, Personnel Specialists, and Education and Training Specialists. All support the squadron’s mission using their respective specialty training.

There are problems inherent in this concept. The first lies in the limitations due to number’s of intelligence specialists and their training. Will they have the time and know-how to do all that is necessary to give the defense force commander and wing commander a complete Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield or will status quo reign? Because of the vast responsibilities and historical lessons from Vietnam, the author thinks this will not be sufficient. For this reason alone, the idea should not be considered

Second, when units are supported by additional AFSCs, a base functional manager controls which faces go into which spaces and how long they stay in a unit. Since flying operations takes precedence, and the Air Force has a shortage of intelligence officers, specifically field graders, it is likely that the SF squadron authorizations will go unfilled. There is a third concern too. What is their peacetime function? Again, this solution is not viable.

There is another solution...one that radically changes the Air Force paradigm and one that will face parochial dissent. Merge the SF and the AFOSI into one career field, retaining the security forces moniker. The Air Force should begin this merger at the AEF lead wings. As explained in the subsequent paragraphs, this will provide the defense force commander an organic ground intelligence capability.

Under the Security Forces Center concept, the AFOSI plays a vital role in the intelligence/counterintelligence role. By design, Antiterrorism Specialty Teams deploy with the 820<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Group's Blue and Black Teams. Lt Col Ron Newsom, former Deputy Group Commander wrote, "In the AEF construct, we will rely heavily on host nation support for local ground intelligence."<sup>2</sup> He goes on to say that, "AFOSI is the primary link, working the network of host intelligence forces and the US Embassy staff."<sup>3</sup>

### **Air Force Office of Special Investigation**

"The primary responsibilities of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation are criminal investigative and counterintelligence service. The organization seeks to identify, investigate and neutralize espionage, terrorism, fraud and other major criminal activities

that may threaten Air Force and Department of Defense resources. AFOSI provides professional investigative service to commanders of all Air Force activities.”<sup>4</sup>

AFOSI has about 1,900 personnel assigned to the organization. Of these, 1,323 (1,099 military and 224 civilian) are federally commissioned special agents. The organization is a field operating agency with its headquarters located at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. Below the headquarters are seven Field Investigative Regions. Originally organized under geographic lines, in 1992, to provide better focus on Air Force needs, regions were co-located with major command headquarters, however, by law, each region operates independently from the command they serve. To support the field agents, specialized services such as technical support, polygraphers, behavioral scientists, computer experts and forensic scientists can be called upon at any time.

“The counterintelligence mission is to primarily counter the threat to Air Force security posed by hostile intelligence services and terrorist groups and to identify and assess the threat for Air Force commanders.”<sup>5</sup> The majority of their investigative activities are felony crimes such as robbery, rape, assault, major burglaries, drug trafficking and other criminal activities. Air Force Instructions outline which type of crimes fall under the AFOSI purview.

### **Air Force Security Forces**

The Air Force Security Forces cover a myriad of responsibilities. The primary ones are base defense, security of warfighting resources, and base law enforcement. As of January 1999, the Security Forces had 21,186 authorizations. Of those, 746 are officer slots. Within the career field, there is one AFSC with two specialty shred-outs: military working dog handler and combat arms, ‘A’ shred and ‘B’ shred, respectively. Each

security forces squadron has, as part of its law enforcement operations, an investigations section. Like AFOSI, they conduct investigations into crimes on the installation but only up to a certain threshold, generally misdemeanors.

From the author's experience, the AFOSI and SF have worked well together in both peacetime and wartime. Vulnerability studies provided by AFOSI are a key factor used in the SF Commander's base defense planning process. Likewise, the mutually beneficial relationship exists in the criminal investigation arena. SF investigators and the AFOSI special agents have worked very well together to solve cases.

## **The Merger**

First of all, once a merger happens, who emerges as the SF leadership, whether an airman of AFOSI or SF background, from headquarters to major command to the unit, is immaterial. There is an Air Force mission to accomplish and leaders in both organization can put this behind them just as was done when Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command merged. Second, why change the system if it is working? It may be working now, but so is the F-15. What needs to be addressed is will the current system work in the next century with increased threats and possible lower budgets where utmost efficiency is needed to meet the mission.

Since October 1998, Security Forces began reporting to the deputy chief of staff for air and space operations. "Bringing the security function under direct management of operations aligns the Air Force with structures adopted by the Army and Marines."<sup>6</sup> A crucial element in providing that protection, as seen through the historical experience, is the capabilities of AFOSI.

To begin the merger, place the AFOSI headquarters organization with the security forces directorate under the deputy chief of staff for air and space operations staff. When merging security forces and AFOSI staffs, redundancies will be identified. Authorizations identified as redundant should be turned into the EAF pool for redistribution to lead AEF units to enhance force protection capabilities. Likewise, at the major command levels; AFOSI regions, already co-located at major command headquarters, should be assigned under the director of security forces. Manpower saved would be transferred to AEF lead units. The judge advocate, will have a major input in this merger since law prevents OSI from being a non-independent organization. By retaining the security forces name, it may be a non-player. If laws must be changed, that can occur too.

At the unit level, where doctrine comes alive, incorporate the detachments into the security forces squadrons, giving enlisted OSI agents a 'C' shred in the career field. To exemplify how a unit would look under this merger a mock squadron should be created. The Able Security Forces Squadron, as part of an AEF lead unit, would have authorizations for four security forces investigators including an E-6 noncommissioned officer in charge. The AFOSI detachment commander is an authorized O-3 commander with six agents authorized. After the merger, the former AFOSI detachment commander would wear two hats, officer-in-charge of investigations and unit S-2.

In peacetime, 10 investigators using these combined assets would investigate all crimes previously covered by AFOSI and SF investigations. Case assignments would be easier with more bodies. Training, temporary duty assignments (now a virtual impossibility with the personnel tempo), and personal leaves would be easier to manage

due to the number of investigators, especially when not on call under the EAF concept. During peacetime, deliberate planning would take place in support of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).

Once a theater of operation has been identified for the upcoming deployment, the ground intelligence officer and his/her team can focus on further IPB through interfacing with various intelligence agencies. All tools available to ground intelligence units would be at their disposal to provide the best possible estimate of the ground situation. The defense force S-3, a member of the in-garrison base defense operation center staff, would build a base defense plan for the deployed location using IPB information provided by the S-2. This information will also be provided through a direct chain of command to the AEF commander, who has ultimate force protection responsibility, to give him a better idea of the tactical environment they are about to enter.

Upon deployment, the ground intelligence section would assume its role as the S-2 on the base defense operation center's staff and focus on the surface dimension of the battlespace. Liaisons with local agencies and the State Department officials in the forward locations must have to be established and maintained to keep the commanders, defense force and Aerospace Expeditionary Force, apprised of changing environments. Proper preparation and follow through should prevent Marine Barracks and Khobar Towers-like attacks from affecting the Aerospace Expeditionary Force success.

### **Bashing Parochialism: Selling the Idea to the Troops**

When the security police merged their three Air Force Specialty Codes in to one under the Security Forces, there was significant consternation that flowed from the units. Generally, law enforcement specialists voiced their concerns that they did not come into

the Air Force to be infantrymen. Certain Combat Arms, Training and Maintenance specialists, who had base-wide distinction by wearing a red hat, felt betrayed to be placed into a larger pool of forces. Professionalism prevailed and all made it through the change.

To sell this merger, from the top down to the newest agent, there would have to be benefits to this vision. And there are, but first some of the drawbacks. The OSI tradition dates back to August 1948. The organization's motto is "Preserving our legacy, protecting the future." Who would be first to defy tradition? Another drawback to a commissioned special agent is that certain officers will not reap the benefits during the merger that their successors will reap in the future, but in all fairness, that will depend on the individual's ability. It is very likely, however, due to the OSI screening process, that agents under this merger concept, will become security forces squadron operations officers and commanders very quickly. For security forces officers, their competition will increase too, but as long as the most qualified officer is in the leadership role, the Air Force will reap the benefits.

The author postulates the benefits are incredible. First and obvious should be a better way of providing force protection or *security* for the Air Force's 21<sup>st</sup> Century fighting force. Additionally, personnel and promotion benefits for the enlisted force are numerous. A few include adding an additional shred in the security forces career field. This will give security forces members, who are leaving the service in droves, more reasons to reenlist.

Typically, to apply to either the 'A' or 'B' shreds, a SF member must be an E-5 and be recommended by the Chief Enlisted Manager of the unit. Once accepted, the SF



member will receive additional training. Training for the 'C' shred (intelligence/investigation) would be highly desirable and very marketable once they retire.

Historically, enlisted security forces make the next stripe, especially in the senior NCO ranks, one year earlier than the rest of the Air Force. Noncommissioned officer special agents who initially merge with the career field will have an adjustment period, but with adjustments come opportunities to gain more experience and, if successful, will rise through the ranks faster. The same applies to officers. Commissioned special agents' opportunity to command will increase, not only because of their abilities, but because command slots available.

There are pluses and minuses to any merger of career fields or major commands. To be able to provide the best protection possible cannot happen without certain changes to the mindset of the Air Force leadership and organizational structure. The next chapter will provide conclusions found in this study.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> United States Army Military Police School White Paper on Police Intelligence Operations, SAMPS White Paper, September 1998, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Lt Col Ron Newsom, "Information Operations: Force Protection Considerations," slide presentation notes, 820<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Group, Lackland AFB, TX

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> USAF Spotlight, Nov 98. "Air Force Office of Special Investigations," [www.dtic.mil/afosi](http://www.dtic.mil/afosi)

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> John Pulley, "Security Forces Directorate is realigned." *Air Force Times*, 19 Oct 98, 7.

## Chapter 6

### Conclusions

“If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us! But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us!”.

— Samuel Taylor Coleridge

This study began with the question, “Are the security forces optimally organized to counter future threats, symmetrical and asymmetrical, to the Expeditionary Aerospace Force to make it a viable military instrument of power?” Historic examples cited in the text show a vital need for ground intelligence when the battlespace includes the surface dimension. Examples also show that human intelligence is the most vital of all in providing the ground commander the necessary information to prevent asymmetrical attacks to ground forces.

However, history has also indicated, through those same examples, that a change as suggested in Chapter Five will have no long-term effect by itself. Change for the sake of change has seldom offered little console, but changes due to logic-based visions carry with it a cascading effect. Visions will become realities and create subsequent visions for future generations. Historical examples outlined in this project lend credence to the premise that the Air Force has been reactionary when facing surface dimensional issues.

The Air Force must change its thought process on the principle of war, *security*, and understand there are three dimensions of a battlespace: surface, air and space. A mindset

revelation has take place and realize that each dimension is different in its own right and has different vulnerabilities and measures to counter the threats. Once that happens, long term changes can take effect. If the Air Force leadership fails to recognize force protection (*security*) as vital to their strategic concept as **air and space superiority** and the other core competencies, history will be repeated with each successful terrorist attack.

The institution can pump money, manpower and ‘advertising’ into symptomatic treatment, but the virus (the mindset), the origin, will go untreated and, therefore, unchanged. As a lasting cure in treating this virus, this project advocates adopting “Force Protection” as a seventh core competency.

AFDD 1 states of air and space superiority: “It provides freedom *to* attack as well as freedom *from* attack. Success in air, land, sea, and space operations depends upon air and space superiority.”<sup>1</sup> If the three dimensional battlespace was understood, it could just as easily say, “It provides freedom *to* attack as well as freedom *from* attack. Success in air, land, sea, and space operations depends upon **force protection.**” And be just as true.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> AFDD 1, 29

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